Although the ecological tradition tends to favour a substantive role for non-market institutions in securing objectives such as environmental sustainability, Green theorists have paid relatively little attention to the important challenge posed to such proposals by the promarket arguments of Austrian Economics. The methods of Ecological Economics, such as multiple criteria evaluation, offer important potential for responding to the Austrian thesis that democratic, non-market institutions face a coordination problem in the face of complexity. However, the development of an adequate ecological response to the Austrians requires clarification of the conceptual underpinnings and potential scope of such methods.
Introduction
The central question of political economy concerning the relative merits of market and nonmarket institutions has inevitably arisen for Green political theorists, whose recognition of the scale of current problems of ecological degradation is increasingly shaping this longstanding debate. Meadowcroft argues that if there is one lesson to be learned from the debate during the 20th Century it is that markets and planning are not mutually exclusive options.
Rather, the question should be that of how best to combine them (Meadowcroft 1999: 37) . This is a point emphasised by the 'Green paradigm' in political thought, which advocates that markets need to operate within the context of a thick layer of democratic political institutions for establishing objectives such as environmental sustainability (Greenwood 2007a) . Writers who fall within the Green paradigm include, to name just three, Herman Daly, Michael Jacobs and John Barry.
While the Green paradigm and the school of Ecological Economics with which it is associated have a close interest in the institutional questions of political economy, they pay relatively little attention to the important critique of non-market planning developed by the Austrian Economists Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich A. Hayek. The ecological tradition, as numerous articles in this journal demonstrate, offers an extensive critique of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) techniques i . In seeking to assign monetary prices to ecological services, CBA is criticised for adopting the assumption of Neoclassical Economics that such values can invariably be fully captured in monetary terms. However, it is Austrian, not neoclassical, economics that offers an explicitly pro-market approach (Mulberg 1992; Pennington 2001; 2003) . The Austrians argue that markets are an indispensable means of achieving social coordination, given the epistemological limitations of economic actors, the dispersion of knowledge across society and the significance of change and uncertainty. While the Green paradigm provides strong normative grounds for contesting the conclusions of Austrian-influenced 'free market environmentalism', the Austrian coordination argument nevertheless poses a significant challenge to Green political economy. This paper explores how Austrian theoretical insights offer a challenge which can spur the further development of an ecological response.
There are some important similarities between the philosophical conceptions of economic choice that underpin the Austrian and ecological schools, as explained in section 2.
It is their contrasting normative commitments that lead them to differ markedly in terms of the kinds of political and economic institutions they propose. Section 3 outlines the challenge that the Austrians' case for markets poses for Green proposals to expand the scope of nonmarket institutions. Research in Ecological Economics has much to offer in response to this Austrian challenge and section 4 assesses the potential offered by an important set of techniques known as multiple criteria analysis (MCA). Drawing from the insights of Austrian theory, clarification of the meaning and scope of concepts such as 'compensability', 'commensurability' and 'trade-offs' in different MCA methods is offered. This is a necessary first stage in the development of an ecological response to the Austrians, meant to encourage further exploration of important questions concerning the scope for non-market institutions to achieve coordination.
Philosophical Underpinnings of Ecological and Austrian Economics
The Austrian tradition in economics has a number of distinguishing features that represent a marked departure from the neoclassical school. Emphasis is placed upon the importance of the concept of time in economic analysis, the radical uncertainty facing economic actors (O'Driscoll and Rizzo 1985) and the need to understand the process through which economic change occurs, not just the formal analysis of economic outcomes (Kirzner 1992 (Greenwood 2006) . The argument developed by the Austrians is that markets are nevertheless an indispensable means of facilitating coordination in the face of the complex plurality of variables that economic decisions involve.
Mises and Hayek identify two closely inter-related, indispensable functions of markets, those of knowledge encapsulation and discovery (Lavoie 1990; Greenwood 2007b This Misesean thesis is further developed by Hayek, whose case for markets has a strong epistemological emphasis (Lavoie 1985; Kirzner 1992 ). Hayek frequently reemphasises the Misesean premise of value incommensurability (e.g. Hayek 1976: 76, 108) .
He stresses that producers' and consumers' needs and preferences are often particular to a certain time and place. As a result, economic knowledge is necessarily dispersed across society. The market mechanism is the best way not only of encapsulating this knowledge through the price mechanism (Hayek 1935: 85) but facilitating knowledge discovery (Hayek 1968 ). Identification of this second function of markets challenges the neoclassical assumption that the ends of individuals can be identified independently of the market process.
The market, it is emphasised, enables economic actors to discover their ends through the process of seeking and assessing the various means of achieving them. This argument was originally directed by the Austrians towards socialist models of non-market pricing.
However, CBA also involves non-market institutions seeking to acquire knowledge of what the value of environmental goods would be if they were traded and is thus similarly vulnerable to this Austrian objection (Mulberg 1992; Pennington 2003 some environmental values, are held to be non-compensatory, meaning that there can be no compensation for failure to fulfil them. It follows that they cannot be captured in terms of an exchange value. In an ordinal ranking of alternatives, those failing to satisfy noncompensatory criteria will always be placed below those that do meet all such criteria, regardless of any compensation that may be offered (Lockwood 1996) . This creates the possibility of a two-tier lexicographical ordering of preferences and represents an important conceptual break from the assumption of Neoclassical Economics that all preferences are substitutable (Spash 2000: 199-200) .
Ecological Economists emphasise the importance of non-compensatory criteria in their discussion of environmental sustainability. They are committed to a 'strong', as opposed to 'weak', version of sustainability. Weak sustainability, as Ekins puts it, derives "from a perception that welfare is not normally dependent on a specific form of capital and can be maintained by substituting manufactured for natural capital, though with exceptions" (Ekins 2000: 76) . Strong sustainability "derives from a different perception that substitutability of manufactured for natural capital is seriously limited by such environmental characteristics as irreversibility, uncertainty and the existence of 'critical' components of natural capital, which make a unique contribution to welfare" (ibid). As Ekins notes, the point at issue between these two views of sustainability is an empirical one concerning the extent to which ecological services are substitutable (ibid: 77). In addition to this empirical perspective, the ecological school stresses that the notion of compensation becomes entirely inapplicable, This scepticism might, however, be a reflection of the real world case studies that are usually considered in Ecological Economics. These tend to involve sustainability limits being (or are at high risk of being) violated, making the concept of compensability less applicable.
In cases where ecological services are substitutable and hence their depletion does not threaten sustainability, a relationship of indifference can be defined between varying levels of the ecological service and the manufactured substitute. In such cases, ecological services could be considered legitimate objects of market exchange. There is recognition of this point in Ecological Economics, where it is advocated that market exchange occurs within the context of a set of non-market institutions for ensuring that economic activity is sustainable.
Hence Martinez-Alier et al refer to "the possibility of limiting the compensability among indicators" rather than rejecting the notion of compensability entirely (my emphasis,
Martinez-Alier et al 1998: 284).
Lockwood's treatment of the concept of compensation is consistent with this approach. He considers the case of a person for whom certain threshold levels of consumption and environmental protection are essential and hence non-compensatory. For such a person, he points out, a "decision that involves choices between changes in personal well-being and nature conservation so that both remain at levels above their respective thresholds may attract compensatory preferences" (Lockwood 1996: 276) . Crowards (1997: 159-60) similarly outlines the possibility of allowing for trade-offs between resources within a framework of certain minimum standards of equity and sustainability.
Just as there is scope for compensability in Ecological Economics, Austrian theory leaves room for recognition of its limits. Even though neither Mises nor Hayek discuss the possibility, nothing that they say rules out the possibility of excluded values being non-compensatory. It is in terms of their perception of the normative significance and empirical scale of problems excluded from consideration by the market, such as threats to environmental sustainability and social equity, that the ecological and Austrian schools differ. Concern about biophysical limits is absent from the Austrians and is even downplayed by modern day, Austrian-inspired 'free market environmentalism' (Greenwood 2007a: 82) . The Austrians are also less concerned by the inequality of wealth that arises from markets. For example, Hayek's procedural theory of justice is entirely compatible with highly unequal outcomes. By contrast, the Green paradigm emphasises the significance of excluded values and is deeply concerned with the challenge of defining democratically accountable non-market institutions to establish non-compensatory limits to the scope of markets. Austrian Economics makes no attempt to address the question of how such non-market institutions might be designed. Nevertheless, Austrian theory, starting from a recognition of the incommensurability of values that it shares with Ecological Economics, raises some important challenges for these Green proposals, to which I turn next.
Three Forms of Complexity
Of central importance for assessing this Austrian challenge is the distinction used by Mises (1920) between the productive and distributive spheres of the economy. Production involves decisions concerning what to produce and how best to produce it. The distributive sphere of the economy involves the distribution of goods once they have been produced. For Mises, non-market production is the defining feature of socialism. Not only is it possible in principle for non-market planning of production to be combined with consumer goods markets but markets of this latter sort would, Mises seems to suggest (1920: 90-2), inevitably arise in a socialist economy. Mises' argument against the feasibility of socialism thus focuses upon the problem of how to plan production in the absence of markets for factors of production (natural resources, labour and manufactured capital). He suggests that it is in this productive sphere of the economy where the complexity challenge that non-market planners would face is most profound.
Three forms of complexity can be identified in Mises work: technical, economic and value complexity. Technical complexity consists of the productive coefficients involved in the vast number of different technologies. Such technical information can indeed, as Neurath points out, be expressed in terms of physical units of measurement. However adept socialist planners might be at gathering technical information, they must still face the problem of economic complexity concerning how to allocate a finite supply of factors of production in order to most efficiently meet production objectives. This problem of economic calculation applies even when it is assumed that a target set of productive outputs for the economy has already been fixed (Mises 1920) . It is one aspect of what Hayek refers to as the 'coordination problem' facing any society. In the face of economic complexity, Mises argues, market prices are indispensable as 'aids to the mind'. This argument has gained widespread acceptance and the Green paradigm considers factor markets to be a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for achieving productive efficiency in the context of economic complexity, as defined here.
The Austrian case for markets is far more contentious in relation to the, logically The Green critique of consumer sovereignty is far from being a denial of value pluralism, that it takes to be an inevitable feature of modern society. While the democratic processes favoured by many Greens might establish a degree of consensus in relation to certain non-market objectives, it is appreciated that opinions will inevitably, to some degree, conflict. So, for example, the task of defining environmental sustainability involves value dimensions relating to the standard of living, time preference and the moral claims of future generations. Definition and implementation of the concept is recognised to be normatively contestable and hence a political issue (Barry 1996: 119) .
On the Green model, non-market forms of decision-making must therefore assess a complex space of economic alternatives in terms of the plurality of values held by individuals across society. This challenge of value complexity is somewhat analogous to that of economic complexity in that it involves decisions between different possible means for achieving certain ends. The challenge of value complexity could be said to be even more profound, given that the 'ends' concerned are human ends that are far less tangible than the quantitatively definable ends of economic calculation.
Hayek raises the important question of how, in the face of value complexity, democratic, non-market institutions can achieve this task in a coordinated way. Although the ecological tradition shares with Austrian Economics a recognition of the importance of local knowledge (O'Neill 2004: 434) , it is generally accepted that such non-market coordination cannot be achieved through localised decision-making alone. Decisions concerning certain resources need to be made across larger geographical scales. As Pennington puts it, "(if)
complex inter-community relations are not to be coordinated through impersonal market forces then at some point recourse must be made to some central "'coordinating' authority" (Pennington 2001: 179) . While the need for some larger scale, including global, decisions is acknowledged by some Green theorists (Dobson 1990: 184; Jacobs 1991: 131; Barry 1999: 118), the question remains of how to coordinate non-market decisions across multiple geographical scales. Pennington (2001) argues, from an Austrian perspective, that discursive processes alone are insufficient for adequately addressing such complex decisions. Certainly it seems that, where market prices fail to provide adequate guidance, non-market institutions require some kind of alternative 'aids to the mind' that enable decision-makers to address the coordination problem. entitlements to the resources concerned need be assumed by MCA. This is in contrast to CBA approaches which presuppose a certain set of property entitlements to the resources being valued that can influence these individual valuations (ibid). Another advantage of MCA is that it offers numerous techniques for assisting where information is missing or uncertain, as is the case in so many environmental problems (Munda 1994: 102) .
The potential role of MCA in addressing the coordination problem highlighted by the Austrians has so far been the subject of relatively little discussion. There have so far been relatively few studies exploring the application of MCA to more complex problems involving 'inter-community coordination' of the kind that Pennington suggests are especially problematic for non-market institutions. Yet the challenge of defining the coordinative role of non-market institutions in the Green paradigm demands that the potential scalability of MCA processes be explored. Refraining from addressing this question would leave Ecological Economics vulnerable to the charge, already made by Özkaynak et al (2004: 294-6) , that it accepts and intends only to complement the current scope of the present day capitalist market economy.
The Austrian presentation of the coordination problem can serve as a framework for evaluating different MCA methods. Vincke (1992) suggests that the numerous different varieties of MCA can be classified into three main types: multi-attribute utility theory (MAUT), outranking techniques and interactive methods. Some techniques might be hybrids of these three kinds of method and the purpose here is not to establish a definitive recommendation of any particular set of techniques. Instead, the aim is to explore some of the key theoretical underpinnings of each generally defined approach, in order to assess the coordinative potential of MCA processes. How, it is asked, does each approach establish 'aids to the mind' for navigating complex decisions involving multiple incommensurable criteria? Addressing this theoretical question is a necessary first step before the broader institutional context of MCA processes can be considered.
In general, the different MCA methods each involve the following essential stages, although the order in which they are conducted can vary. interactive methods (discussed in section 4.3 below) the process of defining alternatives (stage ii above) occurs at a later stage in the MCA process and is also discussed. For the purposes of this conceptual discussion, the term 'decision-makers' is used to refer to a set of people whose preferences are being incorporated into the MCA process. The actual number of people to be included in this set is left unspecified.
Multi-Attribute Utility Theory
The most long-established set of MCA methods is MAUT. This is based upon a set of assumptions of which both Austrian and Ecological Economics are strongly critical. MAUT methods seek to define utility functions that express the decision makers' evaluation of each criterion. The utility scores of each alternative on each of the criteria are then aggregated.
One of the most commonly used aggregation methods is the general additive model, which takes the following form: Vatn (2005: 345) where Uj is the utility of alternative j, ui is a utility function which is a non-decreasing function of the scores gij on criterion i on alternative j. One popular version of the additive model is the 'weighted summation' model, which is as follows:
where wi is the non-negative weight assigned to each criterion to indicate its relative importance and i and pij is the standardised, or 'normalised' score on each criterion.
viii Ecological and Austrian theory provide strong grounds for criticism of some of the core assumptions of MAUT models. Firstly, an assumption of the weighted sum model (though not the additive model in general) is that the utility functions for each criterion are linear (Bouyssou et al 2000: 106-7 ). Yet, in the case of many economic decisions, the relationships between the preferences for variables are often non-linear. For certain criteria, there might even be a non-compensatory minimum standard (see section 2), hence the assumption of the compensability of criteria can also be challenged from an ecological perspective. It should be noted, however, that non-compensatory minimum standards can be incorporated into MAUT methods and even interpreted in terms of utility theory (Nijkamp and Rietveld 1990: 54) .
A variety of 'direct' techniques have been developed that seek to separately establish a utility function for each individual criterion (Vincke 1992: 44-7) . Some of these techniques assume that criteria can be evaluated in terms of cardinal utility, seeking to base valuations upon the relative intensity of preferences. All of these direct techniques assume the preferential independence of criteria. ix As O'Neill puts it, this assumption is that "each value can be treated like a discrete item on a list, its contribution to the final appraisal of a particular item's worth being separable from that of others" (O'Neill 1993: 114) . Challenging this assumption, O'Neill makes the distinctively Hayekian point that the value of criteria cannot be pre-specified in abstract terms, independently of context (ibid). Instead, as Hayek stressed, effective decision-making involves a process of discovering the inter-relationships between the variables that particular, concrete alternatives involve (Hayek 1978: 143) .
Decision makers' values can change once their implications are made apparent in terms of concretely defined outcomes, as numerous MCA case studies have shown (e.g. Keeney et al 1990) .
In the light of such epistemological considerations 'indirect' techniques of criteria evaluation have been developed. These involve inferring utility functions from decision makers' ordinal choices between concrete policy options, rather than requiring a grading of the relative importance of each criterion in isolation (Nijkamp and Rietveld 1990: 49-51; Vincke 1992: 47-8) . This means that the comparison of alternatives (stage vi) precedes the determination of the relative priority of criteria (stage v). The indirect approach is more sensitive to the inter-relationships between criteria in the particular decision context, although this in turn gives cause for questioning how far the resultant utility functions are applicable to decisions made in different contexts.
Assessing the MAUT approach in general, there are echoes of the Austrian perspective in Roy's important observation that:
"(An actor's) preferences may not be completely formulated, may exhibit internal conflicts, and may not be stable. These characteristics may result from a lack of information, different interpretations of a value system, or divergent value systems" (Roy 1996, 77) .
This insight into the further epistemological problems that arise in multiple criteria decisions highlights the need for a procedure that is transparent and hence enables decision-makers to clarify and further understand the inter-relationships between their values and the decision criteria. As highlighted by Austrian theory, facilitating such a discovery process is crucial for addressing value complexity. In comparison to other MCA approaches, it is more difficult to comprehend how the results of MAUT arise from the information provided by the decision maker. This lack of transparency can restrict the extent to which MAUT facilitates the discovery of new, alternative solutions.
Furthermore, in order that complete utility functions can be defined, MAUT approaches require decision-makers to answer a large number of questions covering the full range of possible values for each variable. As practitioners of MAUT methods recognise, this can be a highly costly and time-consuming process (Keeney et al 1990) . As Vincke points out, such an approach becomes wasteful when many of the questions involve trade-offs between inferior alternatives (Vincke 1992: 57) . Hence, while promising increased precision, MAUT techniques can be both costly and lacking transparency. This, along with the scope for challenging some of the assumptions of MAUT approaches, has led many practitioners to adopt alternative kinds of MCA method.
Outranking methods
The suitability of a second set of MCA techniques for addressing the coordination problem, known as 'outranking methods,' can be questioned for different reasons. In contrast to MAUT, outranking methods are specifically designed to avoid the assumption of compensatory criteria. Instead, 'outranking relations' between alternatives are established.
These relations are based upon a series of ordinal rankings of alternatives according to each of the different criteria. An alternative a1 is said to dominate alternative a2 if a1 is preferred to a2 on at least one criterion and decision-makers are indifferent between them on any criterion where a1 is not preferred. All dominated alternatives are eliminated from the candidate set of solutions. To increase the scope for eliminating alternatives, thresholds can be defined to create a range of criteria scores between which decision makers are considered to be indifferent.
Even when such thresholds are set, most problems will involve a choice between multiple, non-dominated alternatives. Those outranking methods that refrain from using numerical weights x are of limited use for such problems, for they are not designed to capture variation in the relative importance of criteria. A simplifying assumption is sometimes made that all of the criteria are of equal weight but this will be unsuitable in many cases. There are certain kinds of problems for which the more open-ended nature of outranking methods could be viewed as a strength. After all, the primary purpose of MCA is to clarify the different dimensions of a problem (i.e. to serve as a decision aid) rather than to necessarily recommend a single, determinate solution. However, for some problems, the number of feasible alternatives is insufficiently reduced in the absence of criteria weights (Lahdelma et al 2000: 602) .
As a further aid to decision-making in such cases, some outranking techniques, such as certain versions of the ELECTRE method, have been designed to incorporate criteria weightings. The sum of the weights of the criteria where an alternative a1 dominates a2 is compared to the sum of all weights to provide a 'concordance index'. A 'discordance index' is also used to veto those alternatives where an alternative scores very badly on a particular criterion. xi The weights used to establish these indices are, 'coefficients of importance' (Munda 1996) indicating the relative importance of one criterion compared to another. They do not imply compensatory trade-offs between criteria in the sense that "an increased amount of the less-valued criterion can compensate for the loss related to the higher-valued one" (Vatn 2005: 341) . Such numerical weightings nevertheless express the relative priority of criteria in terms of a commensurable unit. In this regard, they serve as 'aids to the mind' whilst avoiding the assumption of compensability. A decision is still needed about the level at which to set the criteria weights. This decision could be made through either a direct or indirect method (see section 4.1 above) but either way this involves ordinal choices being made between different possible weightings and the different evaluative outcomes that they imply.
Interactive methods
The complex coordination problems facing non-market institutions, of the kind with which the Austrian pro-market thesis is particularly concerned, often involve trade-offs between continuous variables. This entails a choice between a theoretically infinite number of nondominated alternatives. For example, the problem of defining sustainability involves continuous variables such as ecological resource use and productive capacity. A third set of 'interactive' approaches to MCA are especially suitable for exploring complex problems of this kind (Munda 1993: 44-5) .
Interactive methods have important similarities with the market process, as understood in Austrian theory. The value of criteria are not assumed as given but understood to emerge through a dialectical exploration of the inter-relationships between policy alternatives and ordinal preferences. Interactive methods also avoid the drawbacks arising from the requirement in MAUT to make a comprehensive set of pairwise comparisons across the full range of possible criterion scores. Instead, a trial and error search through the space of candidate solutions is undertaken. Starting with a given candidate solution, decision makers specify the criterion (c1) with the least satisfactory value and the criterion on which they are willing to accept a reduced score (c2) in exchange for an increase in c1. On the basis of this information, a new candidate solution is then identified. This decision process involves addressing 'trade-offs' between criteria without attempting to specify indifference curves between them, and so avoids assuming compensability. Instead, the purpose of the trade-off is to identify a candidate solution that is ordinally preferred. Each stage of the interactive procedure creates a new constraint that narrows down the size of the solution space. This process of specifying preferences is repeated until a solution is reached that the decision maker finds satisfactory. Numerical weights in the sense of 'coefficients of importance' (as described in section 4.2 above) can be inferred from the chosen solution. Some interactive methods allow for previously expressed preferences to be reversed.
This allows for decision makers changing their mind when they discover the implications of their stated preferences. and Gamboa (2006) that is designed to incorporate uncertainty and non-compensatory criteria. As Stagl (2006) shows, ranking alternatives on each criterion even according to very simple ordinal schemas can serve as an important mechanism for facilitating understanding of certain policy issues. These different MCA approaches might each have a role in the context of Green political economy, where there can be room for recognition of compensatory criteria within the context of certain non-compensatory limits.
Nobody suggests that MCA alone can achieve the broadening of participation that is favoured by the Green paradigm. Yet MCA processes could, for example, be used in combination with other institutional mechanisms, such as in the design and/ or evaluation of a set of policy alternatives before they are opened up to wider forms of democratic decisionmaking. The study by De Marchi et al (2000) starts to explore such possibilities, using findings from MCA to formulate a questionnaire designed to extend public involvement in the decision-making process. Experiments with MCA methods have so far been primarily on a relatively small scale. While, such studies provide an important first stage for addressing the challenge of coordination, further research is needed to assess the scalability of such approaches, both in terms of the numbers of participants and the geographical scale of the problems addressed. Only through such a discovery process can the force of the Austrian challenge to Ecological Economics be thoroughly assessed.
Conclusion
Mises and Hayek's thesis, that the coordination problem is beyond the grasp of even the most well-intentioned politicians and planners, offers important insights for assessing non-market institutional processes such as MCA methods. Viewed from this Austrian perspective, MCA approaches face some significant epistemological challenges. These include the problem of eliciting decision makers' preferences and of bridging the gap between the abstract modelling and the concrete reality of policy choices. Also, MCA methods tend to be labour intensive and are therefore less suitable for involving larger numbers of participants.
Nevertheless, MCA methods have been shown to offer a structured yet dynamic approach to non-market decisions that involve multiple, incommensurable criteria. MCA offers ways of identifying the key value dimensions of a problem and exploring the implications of policy alternatives in terms of these values. Clarification of the conceptual underpinnings of the different MCA techniques, as demanded by the Austrian thesis, reveals that they can enable the functions of knowledge encapsulation and discovery to be fulfilled.
Hence MCA methods offer significant cause for questioning Austrian scepticism about the coordinative capacity of non-market institutions.
